AGENDA DOCUMENT #93-28

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AGENDA ITEM



FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20463

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For Meeting of: MAR 4

March 2, 1993

MEMORANDUM

The Commission

THROUGH:

John C. Surina

Staff Director

FROM:

TO:

Lawrence M. Nøble

General Counsel

N. Bradley Litchfield Of Sandard Sandard Counsel

Jonathan M. Levin JZ Senior Attorney

SUBJECT: Draft AO 1993-2

On February 25, 1993, the Commission considered two drafts of the subject advisory opinion. These were the draft presented by the Office of General Counsel (Agenda Document #93-20), and the draft presented by Commissioner Elliott (Agenda Document #93-20-A). After discussion of these drafts, the Commission approved a motion to return Agenda Document #93-20 to the Office of General Counsel to incorporate some of Agenda Document #93-20-A.

This office has attached two new drafts. The first draft, Draft A, incorporates some of the language pertaining to Advisory Opinions 1985-14 and 1984-15 presented in Agenda Document #93-20-A. The second draft, Draft B, is an attempt to reach consensus among the Commissioners by excising much of the legal analysis presented in the agenda documents. Marginal notations on the draft indicate where language has been added, modified, or deleted from Agenda Document #93-20.

Draft A is an attempt to bring together two theories, as directed by the Commission, in one document. The two theories, however, have mutual inconsistencies. The Office of General Counsel recommends Draft B which reaches the same result with a minimum amount of legal analysis and leaves each Commissioner's office free to write a concurring opinion.

We request that these two drafts be placed on the agenda for March 4, 1993.

Attachments

## DRAFT A

ADVISORY OPINION 1993-2

Robert F. Bauer
Perkins Coie
607 Fourteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005-2011



Dear Mr. Bauer:

This responds to your letter dated January 29, 1993, requesting an advisory opinion on behalf of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee ("the DSCC") concerning the application of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended ("the Act"), and Commission regulations to the application of party coordinated expenditure limits to a special Senatorial election together with any run-off.

After Senator Lloyd Bentsen's nomination as Secretary of the Treasury in December 1992, the Governor of Texas appointed an individual as an interim Senator until a special election is held. Candidates from all parties, including any independents, will compete in this election. Under Texas law, if no candidate receives a majority of votes in the special election, a run-off between the top two finishers will occur to determine who will hold the seat. See Election Code §§ 2.021, 2.023, 203.003, and 204.005. The winner will serve out the balance of Senator Bentsen's term, which expires in January 1995. The special election has been scheduled for May 1, 1993.

The DSCC, as agent for the State Democratic Committee of Texas and the Democratic National Committee, will make coordinated expenditures in connection with the impending

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Texas Senate race pursuant to 2 U.S.C. §441a(d)(3). In view of the possibility that there will be a run-off, you ask whether, under section 441a(d), there is a single expenditure limitation on parties supporting candidates in a special election or, in the alternative, a separate limit for a run-off.

The Act and regulations provide that political party committees may make limited expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of candidates for Federal 2 U.S.C. \$441a(d)(1); 11 CFR 110.7(b)(1). national party committee (including any designated agent of the national committee) and state political party committee (including subordinate state committees) may each make expenditures in connection with the general election campaign of a Senatorial candidate in that state who is affiliated with such party. 2 U.S.C. \$441a(d)(3); 11 CFR 110.7(b)(1) and 110.7(a)(4). These two limits (one for the national and one for the state) are set by a formula contained in the Act based on voting age population of the state. 2 U.S.C. \$441a(d)(3)(A) and 441a(c); 11 CFR 110.7(b)(2)(i) and (c), and 110.9(c).

The Act defines "election" to include a general election, but does not separately define the term "general election." See 2 U.S.C. \$431(1). Commission regulations, however, define "general election" to include an election which is held to fill a vacancy in a Federal office and which is intended to result in the final selection of a single

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individual to the office at stake. 11 CFR 100.2(b)(2). regulations also provide that a special election is held to fill a vacancy and may be a primary, general, or run-off election.

The Commission has previously addressed the question of whether a run-off following a special general election would be considered a separate general election or a continuation of the general election for the purposes of 2 U.S.C. \$441a(d). Advisory Opinion 1983-16. In that situation, the State of California held a "special primary" to fill a vacancy for a House seat. Under California law, all candidates of whatever affiliation ran against each other. If any candidate received a majority, he or she was declared the winner. If no candidate received a majority, a subsequent election was held and the candidates were limited to the top vote getter in each "political party or political body." The Commission determined that the first election, although it was labeled a "special primary" and could be followed by a run-off, fit the definition of "general election" because it was held to fill a vacancy in a Federal office (i.e., a special election) and was intended to result in a final selection of a single individual. 100.2(b)(2). The Commission noted that this was consistent with a conclusion of a California appellate court in a 1978 decision.

The Commission also concluded that, in view of the circumstances of the special election process in California,

election campaign which began in connection with the first election. 1/ The Commission further stated, however, that the run-off was not a separate or additional general election allowing for a new \$441a(d) limit, and that only a single set of \$441a(d) limits was allowable. The Commission noted that, under Commission regulations, an election is classified according to one type only. See 11 CFR 100.2. With respect to special elections, no provision is made for characterizing the same election as both a general and a run-off election. See 11 CFR 100.2(f). Thus, only one section 441a(d) limit was available, but it could be utilized for both the first and second elections, i.e., the general and the run-off.

The Commission concludes that there is no practical difference between the situation presented in Advisory Opinion 1983-16 and the situation presented in Texas. Thus, there will be one section 441a(d) limitation applicable to the special election together with any run-off. The special election scheduled for May 1 is a general election under 11 CFR 100.2(b)(2), i.e., it is being held to fill a vacancy in a Federal office and is intended to result in the final selection of a single individual to the office. The possible run-off election fits the definition distinguishing run-offs from general elections, i.e., "[t]he election held after a

<sup>1/</sup> The most significant circumstance was that, although there was a possibility that the first election would select an officeholder, there remained the possibility that a subsequent election would be needed.

general election and prescribed by applicable State law as the means for deciding which candidate should be certified as officeholder elect." 11 CFR 100.2(d)(2).

In addition to considering an initial special election to be a general election, an alternative method of analyzing the special elections in Texas may exist. The preliminary special election in Texas may be viewed as a primary election if it has the practical effect of narrowing many candidates down to two nominees. These nominees would participate in a subsequent "general" election that is "intended to result in the final selection of a single individual." 11 CFR 100.2(b)(2). Political parties would still be able to make coordinated expenditures during the first election, even if it is considered a primary, since the Commission has concluded that \$441a(d)(3) expenditures may be made before the party's general election candidates are nominated. Advisory Opinion 1985-14. See also Advisory Opinion 1984-15.

As noted in Advisory Opinion 1983-16, the Commission's conclusion does not change the status of the run-off election as a separate election for the purposes of the contribution limits in 2 U.S.C. \$441a(a). These limits apply with respect to "any election" or "each election," and do not relate specifically to the determination of what constitutes a general election or a "general election campaign" for the purposes of section 441a(d). Compare 2 U.S.C. \$441a(a)(1), (2), and (6), to 2 U.S.C. \$441a(d).

The legislative history of the Act further supports the

Insert from #93-20-A

Modified language under lined

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separate treatment and interpretation given to contribution limits under 2 U.S.C. \$441a(a) and coordinated expenditure limits under 2 U.S.C. \$441a(d). The Conference report for the 1976 amendments explains section 441a(d) as follows:

This limited permission allows the political parties to make contributions in kind by spending money for certain functions to aid the individual candidates who represent the party during the election process. Thus, but for this subsection, these expenditures would be covered by the contribution limitations stated in subsections (a)(1) [section 441a(a)(1)] and (a)(2) [441a(a)(2)] of this provision.

H.R. Rep. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (1976). This explanation separates the limited permission of party expenditures in 2 U.S.C. \$441a(d) from the contribution limitations of 2 U.S.C. \$441a(a). Furthermore, it indicates that section 441a(d), unlike section 441a(a), addresses the election process, rather than specific selection points within the process. See 11 CFR 110.1(b)(2), (b)(3)(i), and (j)(1); 110.2(b)(2), (b)(3)(i), and (i)(1).The election process always has a single general election and the process may entail other elections either before or after the general election; e.g., nominating convention, popular primary, post-primary or post-general run-offs. All of these are focused on the general election, either as a means to narrow the field before the general election, or afterwards, if the general election is inconclusive. See Advisory Opinion 1983-16.

This response constitutes an advisory opinion concerning application of the Act, or regulations prescribed by the

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AO 1993-2 Page 7 Commission, to the specific transaction or activity set forth in your request. See 2 U.S.C. \$437f. Sincerely, Scott E. Thomas Chairman added Enclosures (AOs 1985-14, 1984-15, and 1983-16)